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Abstract 
 
Family Limited Partnerships (FLPs) represent unique vehicles for transferring wealth, such as 
family businesses, from one generation to another, permitting parents to gradually transfer busi-
ness ownership to children while maintaining control over operations.  FLPs also serve as signifi-
cant shields against the effects of gift and estate taxes, since valuation discounts can be employed 
to reduce the fair market value of partnership interests transferred to children and other family 
members.  However, these tax savings have resulted in aggressive audit and court challenges by 
the IRS.  For accountants, responding to these challenges for their clients means understanding 
both how the financial and tax aspects of FLPs operate.  This article details the critical nontax 
aspects of FLPs and presents a thorough examination of current tax developments, including the 
June 2002 appellate court decisions.  Finally, the article discusses specific steps accountants 
should take in advising their clients to protect family assets and defend against IRS attacks.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
ransferring family wealth from one generation to another, particularly when it exists in the form of a 
family business can be a difficult and complex process.  Parents may not wish to cede immediate 
control over the business to children and no one involved wants to see the assets’ value diminished 
by the onerous burden of gift and estate taxes.  By employing Family Limited Partnerships (FLPs) to transfer family 
wealth, parents can accomplish the twin goals of maintaining parental control over the assets while greatly minimiz-
ing the impact of transfer taxes through use of valuation discounts.   
 
However, because of their success in reducing transfer taxes, FLPs have come under increasingly heavy at-
tack by the IRS.  In numerous court cases and pronouncements, the Service has challenged the validity of FLPs, as-
serting the entities are shams formed only to escape the effects of gift and estate taxes.  While the IRS has lost sev-
eral recent cases, it has also managed to rack up a few wins.  Moreover, the Service has been quick to appeal its 
losses. 
 
 Recent Congressional actions may doom FLPs for entirely different reasons.  In April 2002, the U.S. House 
of Representatives passed a bill to permanently eliminate the estate tax.
1
  Currently, estate tax rates will phase down 
to zero by 2010, then reemerge at 55% for 2011 and subsequent years.
2
  Although the bill did not pass the Senate,
3
 it 
seems likely that the upcoming fiscal year will see more attempts to repeal the estate tax.     
 
 Eliminating the estate tax removes a major tax benefit of FLPs--the valuation discount.  This discount, 
usually employed to reflect considerations such as limited marketability or lack of liquidity of FLP interests, lets a 
substantial portion of the assets’ transferred to the FLP escape estate taxation.  If the estate tax is eliminated, the 
value of such discounts is nil.  Even though the gift tax would remain (neither the 2001 or 2002 tax bills eliminated  
 
_____________________ 
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it), taxpayers might have little tax incentive to make lifetime transfers of family businesses to their children using 
FLPs, when the result could be achieved tax-free at death. 
 
 In these volatile times, should taxpayers use FLPs to shift family assets to offspring or other family mem-
bers?  To assist taxpayers, this article details the critical aspects of FLPs, offering first a brief overview of the nontax 
consideration of forming a FLP.  Secondly, the article examines the current tax developments affecting FLPs, in-
cluding recent appellate court decisions.  Finally, advice is offered on how best to structure the FLP to present a 
strong defense against IRS challenges.  
 
Non-Tax Aspects of the FLP 
 
What Assets Lend Themselves to FLPs?  
 
 In a FLP, all, or substantially all, of the limited partners are family members.  The limited partnership must 
be validly formed under state law and must have at least two partners:  a general partner and a limited partner.  A 
partner can be an individual, trust or a corporation. 
 
 FLPs can serve as vehicles for transferring family wealth from parents to children, while permitting parents 
to retain control over the wealth.  For example, transferring commercial real estate to the FLP lets parents with a 
general partnership interest maintain operational control of the realty, but enables them to move assets when needed 
out of the FLP to children holding limited partnership interests.  This, in turn, protects the transferred assets from 
creditors of the general partners (parents).  
 
 Other examples of assets appropriate for transfer to FLPs would be family businesses or rental real estate.  
Generally, transferring business-related assets provides greater defense against IRS scrutiny, since the Service uses 
lack of business purpose as one means of attack.  However, as discussed later in this article, the IRS’ business pur-
pose challenge has proved ineffective in recent court decisions. 
 
Types of Estate Assets that should be avoided by FLP’s 
 
 While FLPs can be funded with other partnership interests, they should not hold S corporation stock, be-
cause this terminates S corporations status.  However, at least two proposals in recent years would permit FLPs to be 
S corporation shareholders where all partners were members of one family, as determined by Sec. 704(e)(3).
4
  In 
general, assets lacking business purposes should not be used to fund FLP’s.  Caution is indicated on the transfer of 
personal assets to the FLP, such a family home.  While the transfer would protect the home against claims against 
the general partner, it exposes the home to creditor claims against the partnership. It may also void the transfer for 
estate tax purposes under Sec. 2036 if the transferor continues to use the residence, as was the case in Reichardt
5
and 
Schauerhamer,
6
 both of which are discussed in later sections of this article. 
 
Benefits of a FLP 
 
Defined Control and Risk for General and Limited Partners 
 
 While holding a general partnership interest in an FLP permits control of day to day operations of the part-
nership (including the timing of distributions to the limited partners), it also exposes the general partner to unlimited 
liability for partnership debts.  This can be resolved by using a corporation or a Limited Liability Company (LLC) as 
the general partner.  In contrast, limited partners have no role in the partnership operations and have their risk li-
mited to the cost basis of their partnership interests. 
 
Advantages over an Irrevocable Living Trust 
 
 Because partners can transfer their interests (to the extent permitted by the partnership agreement), a FLP 
offers more flexibility than an irrevocable trust-permitting the addition of more family members as limited partners 
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in the future.  At death, only the decedent’s own partnership interest (whether general or limited) is included in the 
estate.  No interest in the FLP given by the decedent to other family members is included in the estate, even though 
the decedent as the general partner had control over partnership assets.  This ability to retain control over assets in the 
estate is a major advantage of an FLP over an irrevocable trust.  In the latter, the transferor’s retention of the right to 
control distributions to other beneficiaries will cause trust assets to be included in the donor’s estate, under Sec. 
2036. 
 
 However, taxpayers forming FLPs must be aware that the IRS has been successful in employing Sec. 2036 
in FLP situations.  Sec. 2036 ―pulls back‖ into the decedent’s estate any previously transferred property where the 
decedent retained incidents of ownership or enjoyment (or had the ability to designate these rights to others).  Where 
taxpayers have carelessly disregarded the FLP’s existence by living in FLP-owned residences without paying rent, or 
commingling business and personal funds, or having the FLP pay personal expenses, the Service has won in court on 
the Sec. 2036 issue.  This situation is discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
 
Protection From Creditors 
 
 Since the partnership is owned by all of the partners, it is more difficult for creditors of individual partners 
to attach the business’ jointly-owned assets.  Parents acting as general partners can further protect assets against 
creditors by limiting their ownership interests to as little as 1% or by forming a corporation to act as the general 
partner while they take a limited partner position.   
 
 Creditors of a specific partner may be able to obtain charging orders giving them the right to receive distri-
butions of the debtor partner. However, since the general partner controls FLP distributions, the viability of a charg-
ing order for a FLP may be nil.  Moreover, the charging order makes the creditor liable for a pro-rata share of part-
nership taxable income, even though no distributions are made.  This protection only blocks claims against the part-
nership for non-partnership activities of a specific partner.  No such protection is offered for the activities of the 
partnership itself.   
 
 Further, creditors may have specific remedies under state law other than charging orders which give them 
access to partnership assets.  Courts will examine FLPs closely in cases where the entities are effective in blocking 
creditors and will closely examine whether a valid business purpose exists for the FLP.  FLPs deemed to be formed 
primarily for the protection of assets are commonly viewed by the courts as a device to defraud creditors and may be 
voidable.   
 
Allocation of Income Between Family Members 
 
 Because FLP income is allocated according to the partnership agreement, taxable income can be shifted 
from higher income parents/partners to lower income children/partners.  This may also serve to convert passive in-
come into earned income if the child provides services to the partnership and may permit the creation of a qualified 
retirement plan resulting in further shielding of the income from taxation.   It is critical that allocations of taxable in-
come gains, losses, and deductions be consistent with the reality of the services provided by the partners.  In busi-
nesses such as real estate, where capital is a significant income producing factor, parents will need to plan on giving 
limited partnership interests to their children to permit allocations of income to follow.  
 
Transfer Considerations 
 
Depreciation 
 
 The transfer of depreciable property to the FLP spreads the depreciation adjustment proportionately to all 
partners.   This can be problematic in the case of children who are limited partners and lack income or are in lower 
tax brackets than the general partners.   
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Disguised Sales 
 
 In most situations, assets can be contributed to a partnership without tax consequences unless the disguised-
sale rules come into consideration.  Creating a gain under the disguised-sale rules can normally be avoided by not 
permitting any distributions of the contributed property for a reasonable time period subsequent to the formation of 
the FLP. 
 
Debt Burdened Property 
 
  Finally, contributions of property with debt greater than basis will result in taxable gain to the donor unless 
the donor remains liable for the debt subsequent to the contribution.  
 
Illustrative Examples of Common Uses of FLP’s 
 
 When might using an FLP make sense?  The following examples are situations often encountered by practi-
tioners when an FLP could be a solution to tax, inheritance and liability protection concerns.   
 
Example 1 
 
 John and Joan Jones have three teenage children and own $1 million of valuable income-producing real es-
tate. They would like to start making annual gifts of $11,000 each to take advantage of the gift tax exclusion and to 
provide college funding for the children. They do not want to establish trusts because of the high tax rates on re-
tained trust income.  They have also rejected the idea of custodial accounts, since the children could gain unsuper-
vised access to funds at age 18. 
 
 By transferring the real estate to an FLP, John and Joan can begin shifting family assets to their children 
while maintaining operational control over.  Each year, the parents could transfer $24,444 of limited partnership in-
terests to each child tax free (employing a 10% minority interest discount of $7,333 and $66,000 of gift tax exclu-
sions), for a total of $73,333.
7
  As general partners, John and Joan can control distributions to the children even after 
age 18. The partnership property cannot be sold unless the parents choose to do so.   
 
Example 2 
 
 Thomas Brown is a recently widowed senior citizen with three adult children and a wholly owned business 
worth about $1 million. The business is expected to continue to grow rapidly. His wife's death has forced Thomas to 
face his immediate estate planning needs. If the business increases in value to $2 million, the federal estate tax due 
on his death will be $500,000 in 2002.  Consequently, he would like to remove the business from his taxable estate 
without giving up control over its operations. 
 
 Thomas contributes the business to an FLP designating an S Corporation owned by him as the 1% general 
partner. Thomas will continue to be employed by the business so his salary needs will provide his income. Initially, 
Thomas holds 96% of the limited partnership interest. Each of his children makes a contribution to the partnership 
and holds an initial 1% limited partnership interest. Thomas then divides his 96% limited partnership interest worth 
$1 million into three equal pieces and gives them to his three children.  Qualified appraisers determine a 20% minor-
ity discount along with a 20% lack of marketability discount as an appropriate reduced value for the interests. 
 
 Consequently, Thomas is able to reduce the value of his estate by $1 million, as the taxable basis of the 
gifts is only $640,000.
8
 Furthermore, $33,000 of the $640,000 will be exempt from gift taxes due to the yearly ex-
clusion; the remainder can be excluded by using a portion of his $1,000,000 unified tax credit equivalent, thus eli-
minating any gift tax bill. 
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Tax Aspects of the FLP 
 
The IRS’ Position 
 
The IRS views FLPs as devices formed to escape transfer taxes.  This view is triggered by taxpayers’ ag-
gressive uses of valuation discounts (some up to 50-55%) when transferring limited partnership interests to family 
members as gifts or devises.  For example, in Strangi,
9
 using a FLP as a transferring vehicle reduced the amount 
subject to estate taxes from $9.9 million to $6.6 million.  Similarly, in Knight,
10
 assets worth $2.2 million were va-
lued at $1 million after use of a FLP and valuation discounts. 
 
A Typical Example 
 
Illustration One indicates how a typical FLP transaction is structured.  The taxpayer forms both a FLP and 
usually a second entity, such as a corporation, to serve as the FLP’s general partner.  In this example, a $5 million 
transfer of assets from the taxpayer funds the corporate general partner for $50,000 and secures a 99% limited part-
ner’s interest in the FLP worth $4.95 million (Step One of Illustration One).   
 
In Step Two, the taxpayer transfers all or a substantial portion of the limited partnership interest to other 
family members--in this case, to three children.  Because what the taxpayer conveys at this point is not clear title and 
ownership of the actual assets, but only ownership of limited partnership interests, a valuation discount (or dis-
counts) is/are applied to reflect the reduced control over the partnership assets that the children hold as minority li-
mited partners.  It is this reduced valuation ($3.465 million in Illustration One) that serves as the tax basis for the 
transfer taxes (reduced in the case of gifts by the yearly $11,000 per donee exclusion and by any application of the 
unified transfer tax credit). 
 
An obvious question to ask is why the diminution of value from $4.95 to $3.465 million does not occur on 
the taxpayer’s initial transfer of assets into the FLP in exchange for the 99% limited partnership interest.  The IRS 
has advanced this position in court (albeit unsuccessfully), arguing the taxpayer has made a gift on formation of the 
FLP equal to this drop in value.  As explained in the following pages, this argument has, with rare exception, fallen 
on deaf ears in the courts. 
 
The Strangi Case 
 
Illustration Two shows the elements in the Tax Court case of Strangi.
11
  The taxpayer’s son-in-law, acting 
under power of attorney, formed a FLP and a corporation.  Strangi contributed $9.9 million in assets (75% of which 
was cash and receivables) to the FLP for a 99% limited partnership interest and $49,350 to the corporation for a 47% 
interest.  His children contributed $55,650 to the corporation for a 53% interest.  The corporation then contributed its 
$105,000 to the FLP for a 1% general partnership interest. 
 
When Strangi died, his estate distributed the 99% limited partnership interest proportionately to the four 
children.  The children contributed a combined 1% of their interests in the FLP to a local college.  A fair market val-
ue (FMV of $6.6 million for the limited partnership interests was recorded for estate tax purposes. 
 
The Knight Case 
 
Illustration Three shows the elements in the Tax Court case of Knight.  Here taxpayers (husband and wife) 
formed a FLP and a managing trust to serve as the FLP’s general partner, contributing $2 million in assets to the 
FLP for a 100% limited partnership interest and then contributing 1% of that interest to the managing trust.  Taxpay-
ers served as trustees for the managing trust. 
 
Taxpayers then gifted 89.2% of their FLP limited partnership interest to two trusts established for their 
children.  The children were the trustees and beneficiaries of the trusts.  The FMV recorded for the gift was $1 mil-
lion after valuation discounts. 
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The IRS’ Arguments Against FLPs 
 
Eager to curb what it feels is a growing abuse of the use of FLPs and their related cousins, family limited 
liability companies (FLLCs), the IRS has stepped up audits and is aggressively attacking FLPs and FLLCs in court.  
The IRS’ National Office has issued instructions to its agents for opposing FLPs in Field Service Advice (FSA) 
200049003
12
 and FSA 200143004.
13
  The grounds for attack listed in the FSAs and echoed in the government’s 
court arguments, are as follows: 
 
(1) Economic substance doctrine 
(2) Sec. 2703  
(3) Sec. 2704 
(4) Gift on formation 
(5) Sec. 2036 (in estate tax situations) 
(6) Amount of valuation discount 
 
With the exception of items 5 and 6, each argument above seeks to ignore the FLP, so that the full value of assets 
transferred by the taxpayer to the entity becomes subject to transfer taxes, instead of the greatly reduced value of the 
limited partnership interest conveyed by the taxpayer to other family members.  This approach has met with little 
success in litigation.  The courts have disagreed, choosing to respect FLPs and FLLCs validly formed under applica-
ble state law.  With respect to valuation discounts, even the Field Service Advices grudgingly concede that such dis-
counts may be necessary.
14
  This concession by the Service is offered only ―if the taxpayer can show the form of the 
FLLC must be respected.‖15  Each of these arguments is discussed in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
Recent Developments 
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has just handed down a decision in Strangi,
16
 agreeing with the Tax 
Court that the FLP should be respected and affirming the lower court’s decisions for the taxpayer on the issues of 
business purpose and economic substance, Sec. 2703, gift on formation and valuation discounts. The appeals court  
remanded Strangi back to the Tax Court to reconsider a Sec. 2036 issue not addressed by the trial court.  The Sec. 
2036 issue is discussed later in this article. 
 
In addition, the Fifth Circuit also affirmed for the taxpayer in Kerr,
17
 again upholding recognition of the 
FLP as an entity and permitting the valuation discounts.  In Kerr, the issue was the Service’s attempt to apply Sec. 
2704 to ignore the FLP.  Sec. 2704 and the Kerr case are also discussed in subsequent pages. 
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Illustration One 
 
Step One: Formation of FLP and Corporation: 
 
(a): Taxpayer (TP) forms a Corporation (CORP), contributing 
$50,000 for 100% ownership.  The transfer is nontaxable under 
Sec. 351. 
 
TP 
$50,000  
CORP 
100% Stock 
 
 
(b): TP forms a Family Limited Partnership (FLP), contributing 
$4,950,000 for a 99% limited partnership interest (LP interest).  
The transfer is nontaxable under Sec. 721. 
 
 
TP 
$4,950,000  
FLP 
99% LP Interest 
 
(c): CORP contributes $50,000 to FLP for a 1% general partnership in-
terest (GP Interest).  The transfer is nontaxable under Sec. 721. 
 
 
CORP 
$50,000  
  FLP 
1% GP Interest 
 
 
 
Step 2:  Distribution of Limited Partnership Interest to Taxpayer’s 
Children and Application of Valuation Discount 
 
Taxpayer gives a 33% LP interest to each of TP’s three children (C1, 
C2 and C3).  A 30% minority discount is applied, resulting in a FMV 
for gift tax purposes of $3,465,000 for the total interests transferred 
(before consideration of the $11,000 yearly exclusions and the unified 
credit). 
 
 
TP 
33% LP Interest  
C1 
 
 
 
33% LP Interest  
C2  
 
 
33% LP Interest  
C3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step One Result 
TP holds 100% interest in 
CORP with FMV of $50,000 
 
TP holds 99% LP Interest in 
FLP with FMV of $4,950,000 
TP 
CORP 
FLP 
100% 
99%  
LP Interest 
      1% 
GP Interest 
Step Two Result 
33 % 
LP 
 
 
 
 
C2 
 
TP 
33 % 
LP 
33 % 
LP 
 
C1 
 
TP holds 100% interest in CORP 
with FMV of $50,000 
 
C1, C2 and C3 each hold 33% LP 
Interests in FLP with total FMV of 
$3,465,000 
CORP 
   FLP 
100% 
1% GP 
Interest 
C3 
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Illustration Two – The Strangi Case 
 
Step One: Formation of FLP and Corporation: 
 
(a): Taxpayer (TP) forms a Corporation (CORP), contributing 
$49,350 for 47% ownership.  TP’s children (TPC) contribute 
$55,650 for 53% ownership. 
 
 
TP 
$49,350  
CORP 
47% Stock 
 
 
TPC 
$55,650  
CORP 
53% Stock 
 
(b):  TP forms a Family Limited Partnership (FLP), contributing 
$9.9 million for a 99% limited partnership interest (LP inter-
est).  CORP contributes $105,000 for a 1% general partner’s 
interest 
 
TP 
$9.9 million  
FLP 
99% LP Interest 
 
CORP 
$105,000  
FLP 
1% GP Interest 
 
 
Step 2: Distribution of Limited Partnership Interest to  
Taxpayer’s Children and Application of Valuation Discount 
 
Taxpayer’s estate (ESTATE) gives 99% LP interest to TP’s children 
(TPC).  A 25% minority discount and a 25% marketability discount 
are applied, resulting in a FMV for estate tax purposes of $6.6 mil-
lion.  TPC then transferred 1% of their interests to a college 
(SCHOOL). 
 
 
ESTATE 
99% LP Interest  
TPC 
 
 
 
TPC 
1% LP Interest  
SCHOOL 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEP TWO RESULT 
 
 
TPC holds 98% LP Interest in 
FLP with FMV of $6.65 million 
CORP 
    53%  
 
       1% 
GP Interest 
ESTATE 
    47%  
 
FLP 
98% LP  
Interest 
 
    47%  
 
Step One Result 
TP holds 47% interest in CORP 
with FMV of $49,350. TCP hold 
53% with FMV of $55,650 
 
TP holds 99% LP Interest in FLP 
with FMV of $9.9 million 
CORP 
FLP 
  53%  
 
       1% 
GP Inter-
est 
TP 
    99%  
LP Inter-
est 
 
SCHOOL 
      1% 
LP Interest 
TPC 
TPC 
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Illustration Three – The Knight Case 
 
 
Step One:  Formation of FLP and Managing Trust: 
 
(a): Taxpayer (TP) forms a Family Limited Partnership (FLP), 
contributing $2.08 million for a 100% limited partnership in-
terest (LP interest).  The transfer is nontaxable under Sec. 
721. 
 
 
 
 
(b):  TP forms a Managing Trust (MT), contributing a 1% interest 
in the FLP.  The trust serves as general partner in the FLP. 
 
 
TP 
1% LP Interest  
MT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2:  Distribution of Limited Partnership Interest to Children’s 
Trusts and Application of Valuation Discount 
 
TP gives 89.2% LP interests to children’s trusts (CT). Valuation 
discounts are applied, resulting in a FMV for gift tax purposes of 
$1.04 million for the total interests transferred.  
 
 
 
TP 
 
 
89.2% LP Interest 
 
 
 
CT  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TP $2 million  
FLP 
100% LP Interest 
 
 
STEP ONE RESULT 
TP holds 99% interest in FLP 
with FMV of $2 million 
 
MT holds 1% LP Interest in 
FLP  
TP 
     1%  
GP Interest 
      99%  
LP Interest 
FLP 
MT 
STEP TWO RESULT 
CT holds 89.2% LP interest in 
FLP with FMV of $1.04 million 
 
TP holds 9.8% LP Interest in 
FLP  
FLP 
MT CT TP 
89.2% 
LP  
1%  
GP 
9.8%  
LP  
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Economic substance doctrine:  IRS Argues Income Tax Standard Should Apply in Transfer Tax Cases 
 
The economic substance doctrine originated in Gregory v. Helvering,
18
 where the Supreme Court held a 
corporate formation and subsequent reorganization could be disregarded when the substance of those transactions 
was to avoid tax on a transfer of stock.  In FSA 20049003, the Service indicated it will apply the economic sub-
stance doctrine to FLPs and FLLCs by questioning the following: 
 
 Whether the taxpayer had a valid business purpose or profit motive for the transaction and 
 Whether the transaction appreciably changed the taxpayer’s economic position.‖19 
 
In cases such as Strangi
20
 and Knight,
21
 the Service argued FLPs should be ignored because they lacked 
economic substance.  This would have required taxpayers to base the transfer taxes on a proportionate share of the 
fair market value of the actual partnership assets and not on the value of the limited partnership interests transferred, 
thus eliminating any valuation discounts.   
 
However, in relying on the economic substance doctrine, the IRS is championing a standard most success-
fully employed in court to challenge abuses involving income taxes; not transfer taxes.  The use of the business pur-
pose argument has proved unsuccessful in transfer tax situations.  In concurring opinions to Strangi
22
 and Knight,
23
 
the judges state bluntly ―the economic substance doctrine, with its emphasis on business purpose, is not a good fit 
(when) dealing with donative transfers.
24
 Similarly, ―the Court should conclude that the economic substance doc-
trine does not operate to disregard a validly formed entity where the issue is the value for Federal gift and estate tax 
purposes of the interest transferred in that entity.
25
 
 
The Tax Court:  Business Purpose Not Controlling for Transfer Taxes 
 
When evaluating the IRS’ economic substance arguments, the Tax Court downplays the importance of 
business purpose.  In Strangi, for example, the Court flatly notes ―we are skeptical of the estate’s claim of business 
purposes‖26 since there were ―no business assets contributed‖27 to the FLP.  Similarly, in Knight, the facts stipulate 
that the FLP ―never conducted any business activity,‖28 and the ―partners never met and never discussed any busi-
ness activity.‖29 
 
Instead, the Court’s application of the economic substance doctrine rests substantially on the second prong 
of the argument as to whether the taxpayer’s economic position has been appreciably changed by the transaction.  In 
essence, the Court has ruled that, if the taxpayer validly forms a FLP under applicable state law, the Federal gov-
ernment must respect the creation of this entity and the alterations the entity imposes on ownership and control of 
the underlying assets.  As noted in a concurring opinion to Knight, ―if taxpayers are willing to burden their property 
with binding legal restrictions that, in fact, reduce the value of such property, we cannot disregard such restric-
tions.‖30 
 
The Tax Court’s Interpretation of the Economic Substance Test 
 
Since both Strangi
31
 and Knight
32
 represent cases reviewed en banc by the full Tax Court (a relatively rare 
situation), the importance of the Court’s determination that the economic substance test rests not on business pur-
pose, but on the changed economic position of the taxpayer, should not be taken lightly.  In essence, this means state 
law will control when defining property rights for transfer taxes; federal law determines only the appropriate tax 
treatment of these rights.
33
  
 
The Tax Court interprets the economic substance test doctrine for FLPs along the two dimensions—the 
first, an objective test; the second, a subjective matter of opinion.  The two dimensions are as follows: 
 Whether the FLP is validly formed under applicable state law and 
 Whether a hypothetical willing buyer would respect the FLP. 
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Valid Partnership Formation—The Objective Test 
 
Creating a FLP means state law defines the relationships between general and limited partners, usually in 
accordance with the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.   Because the partnership agreement imposes legal 
rights and restrictions on the partners, enforceable in court, the partners’ legal control over partnership assets, partic-
ularly the limited partners’, is fundamentally altered.  As the Tax Court indicates in Strangi the FLP ―changed the 
relationships between decedent and his heirs and decedent and actual and potential creditors.‖34 Similarly in Knight, 
the taxpayers’ ―rights and legal relationships and those of their children changed significantly when petitioners 
formed the partnership, transferred assets to it and transferred interests in the partnership to their children’s’ 
trusts.‖35 
 
Defining the economic substance test solely on the unidimensional question of whether or not a FLP was 
validly formed seems somewhat simplistic, leading one to question whether the Court is now exalting form over 
substance.  Perhaps to counter this, the Tax Court has linked the valid formation test with a corollary ―willing buy-
er/willing seller‖ requirement.   Thus, mere creation of an entity to hold taxpayer’s assets, while an arguably neces-
sary first step in the FLP dance of transfer of ownership, is not sufficient to guarantee the economic substance test is 
met.  The question becomes whether an independent third party, the ―hypothetical buyer,‖ would also recognize and 
respect the changes imposed by state law on the assets. 
 
The Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Subjective Test 
 
The amount of tax for Federal estate and gift tax purposes is based on the fair market value (FMV) of the 
property transferred.
36
  This FMV, in turn, is defined as ―the price at which such property would change hands be-
tween a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having rea-
sonable knowledge of relevant facts.‖37 
 
In Knight, the Court applied the ―willing buyer/willing seller‖ standard, indicating they would not disregard 
the FLP because ―we have no reason to conclude from this record that a hypothetical buyer or seller would disregard 
it.‖38  Further, ―the form of the transaction here (the creation of the partnership) would be taken into account by a 
willing buyer.‖39  Likewise, in Strangi, the FLP’s existence ―would not be disregarded by potential purchasers of 
decedent’s assets.‖40 
 
How does a taxpayer ensure compliance with this hypothetical standard?  Certainly, a critical element is 
adherence to the legal formalities of the FLP.  The FLP must be validly formed, title to transferred assets should 
move to the entity, partnership tax returns and Schedule K-1s must be filed.  While business purpose may no longer 
be a controlling factor, the taxpayer and his offspring will strengthen their cases against an economic substance ar-
gument by respecting the legal form of the FLP and behaving in businesslike fashion in their dealings with the enti-
ty.  Thus, if the limited partners enjoy the use of FLP assets such as rental real estate, they should also pay rents 
equal to FMV for this use; if the general partner authorizes distributions from the FLP to limited partners, it should 
be based on business reasons and not driven by family relationships between the general and limited partners. 
 
Strangi:  The Appeals Court Decision 
 
In its recent decision in Strangi, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the Tax Court’s decision for 
the taxpayer in the business purpose/economic substance test.  The Court noted that the partnership agreement 
―changed legal relationships between decedent and his heirs and creditors‖41 and thus, the FLP must be respected.  
Further, the appellate court upheld the willing buyer/willing seller standard by emphasizing that ―potential purchas-
ers of decedent’s assets would not disregard the partnership.‖42 
 
As important as the Fifth Circuit’s decision is, it does not control court outcomes in other circuits.  There, 
the IRS will continue to apply its collection of arguments against the FLP.  The next section of this paper emphasiz-
es that, in respecting the legal form of the FLP, it is critical not to impose restrictions on the FLP beyond those con-
tained in applicable state law.  To do so weakens the taxpayers’ case that the FLP is a separate legal entity and gives 
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credence to the Sec. 2704 argument advanced by the IRS in seeking to ignore the FLP.  Sec. 2704 and the related 
Sec. 2703 are discussed below. 
 
Section 2703 and Section 2704: The Service Attempts to Ignore the FLP 
 
In 1990, Congress enacted Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code, which includes Sections 2703 and 
2704, to block use of devices such as ―estate freezes‖ which imposed restrictions on the right to sell or use property.  
Such restrictions, reflected in valuation discounts, reduced the property’s FMV for transfer taxes.  For example, a 
parent might enter into a buy-sell agreement for the family business with a child where the agreement contained re-
strictions on the sale or use of the property.   Because a willing buyer would take such restrictions into account in 
determining the purchase price offered for the business, the impact of the restrictions was to decrease the property’s 
FMV for transfer tax purposes.  
 
Section 2703 
 
 Under Sec. 2703(a), any restrictions imposed on the sale or use of property are ignored when determining 
its FMV for estate and gift tax purposes.
43
  The only exception to this general rule is Sec. 2703(b) which permits re-
strictions to be imposed if they are (1) part of a bona fide business arrangement, (2) are not devices to transfer prop-
erty to family members for less than FMV and (3) contain terms comparable to those found in arm’s length transac-
tions.
44
 
 
 The Service has attempted to apply Sec. 2703 in FLP situations, arguing that the FLP itself is as a restric-
tion on the limited partners’ rights to sell or use partnership assets and that the relief provisions of Sec. 2703(b) do 
not apply.  This approach subjects the full FMV of the underlying assets, not the reduced FMV of the transferred 
FLP limited partnership interest, to transfer taxes.  In other words, valuation discounts are ignored. 
 
 The Tax Court has disagreed.  In Strangi, the Court found no support for the Service’s interpretation of Sec. 
2703(a)(2):  ―neither the language of the statue nor the language of the regulation supports respondent’s interpreta-
tion.‖45 The property correctly included in Strangi’s estate was his limited partnership interest; not the underlying 
assets of the FLP.
46
   The Tax Court stated that Congress did not intend Sec. 2703 to treat the partnership properties 
as assets of the estate where the decedent held only a limited partnership interest at the time of death.
47
 
 
Section 2704  
 
Section 2704(b) requires that ―applicable restrictions‖ on property be ignored when determining its FMV. 
This section applies when an interest in a partnership or corporation is transferred and the transferor and her  family 
control the entity immediately before the transfer.
48
  ―Applicable restrictions‖ are those limiting the entity’s ability 
to liquidate which the transferor or any family member, either alone or collectively, can remove.
49
   
 
For example, assume Mother and Son are the only partners in a partnership.   The partnership agreement 
provides the partnership cannot be terminated.  Mother dies, leaving her partnership interest to Daughter.  As the 
sole partners, Daughter and Son together could remove the restriction in the agreement on the partnership termina-
tion.  Under Sec. 2704(b), any valuation discount on the Mother’s partnership interest in her estate would be ig-
nored.
50
 
 
The exception to Sec. 2704(b)’s general rule lies in Sec. 2704(b)(3).  Here liquidation restrictions are per-
mitted if they are not any more restrictive than existing limits under Federal or state law.
51
  In other words, if Federal 
or state laws impose equal or greater restrictions on a FLP’s ability to liquidate, any similar partnership agreement 
restriction on liquidation will be respected. Since valuation discounts are employed to reflect such restrictions, if 
Sec. 2704(b)(3) applies, the discounts should also be upheld. 
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Kerr v. Commissioner 
 
The leading case in the Sec. 2704 area is Baine P. Kerr v. Commissioner,
52
 where the Service raised the 
Sec. 2704(b) argument against a FLP formed under Texas law.  The partnership agreements in Kerr stipulated the 
entity would dissolve and liquidate upon the earlier of 50 years or agreement of all the partners.
53
  The IRS argued 
the 50 year clause was more restrictive than  applicable Texas law, which permitted a limited partner to withdraw by 
giving 6 months’ notice and thus, transfer taxes should apply to the full FMV transferred.54  
 
Disagreeing and ruling for the taxpayer, the Tax Court said the Service erred by looking to state law go-
verning withdrawals, instead of liquidation rights in applying Sec. 2704(b).  Relevant Texas law permitted dissolu-
tion of the FLP by written consent of all partners, a stipulation echoed in the two Kerr partnership agreements.  
Thus, Sec. 2704(b)(3) applied, since the liquidation restrictions in the partnership agreements were ‖no more restric-
tive than the limitations that generally would apply to the partnerships under Texas law.‖55  The Tax Court’s deci-
sion in Kerr was successfully relied upon by taxpayers in the cases of Knight
56
 and Estate of Jones.
57
  Further, Kerr 
has just been upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
58
 
 
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit upheld the 46.4% effective valuation discounts in Kerr (17.5% for minority 
interest and 35% for lack of marketability).
59
  However, the appellate court did not follow the Tax Court in examin-
ing whether the FLP’s restrictions did or did not exceed those found in state law.  Rather, the court went back to Sec. 
2704(b)’s general rule and focused on whether the liquidation restrictions were invalid because they were removable 
by the transferor or any family members, acting alone or collectively. 
 
Family members held nearly all of the limited partnership interests in Kerr.  However, the taxpayer made a 
gift of a small interest in the FLP to a university.  The IRS argued on appeal that the university would not oppose the 
family in removing the liquidation restrictions, so Sec. 2704(b) should apply and the valuation discounts should be 
ignored.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating that the Code looked exclusively to family members when determining 
the removability of restrictions.  By having a nonfamily member, the university, hold a limited partnership interest, 
the family members could not act together to remove the liquidation restrictions.  The Court noted that the Code 
provides ―no exception allowing us to disregard non-family members who have stipulated their probable consent to 
removal of the restriction.‖60 
 
Gift on Formation of FLP 
 
In order to negate the valuation discounts associated with transfers of FLP interests, the Service may argue 
under Sec. 2512(b) that the taxpayer has made a gift on the initial formation of the FLP.  Sec. 2512(b) provides that 
where property is transferred for less than adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth, the differ-
ence is a gift.  The government’s leading case is Kincaid,61 where the taxpayer transferred ranchland worth $634,000 
to a family corporation in exchange for nonvoting common and preferred stock valued at $171,300.  The Fifth Cir-
cuit held the difference to be a gift, since the taxpayer could have only had a donative purpose for accepting ―patent-
ly low-value non-voting stock in exchange for far more valuable ranchland.‖62 
 
Where FLPs are concerned, the Service believes the amount of gift on formation equals the difference be-
tween the FMV of assets transferred by the taxpayer and the FMV later assigned to the limited partnership interest 
for transfer tax purposes.  Thus, in Strangi, the IRS asserted that a gift of $3.3 million was made, representing the 
difference between the $9.9 million in assets contributed to the FLP and the $6.6 million of value assigned to the li-
mited partnership interest on the estate tax return.
63
  Similarly, in Church, the government argued a gift was made 
equal to the difference between the $1.5 million in assets contributed by the taxpayer to the partnership and the 
$617,591 value of her interest in the partnership at death.
64
 
 
 The trial courts in Strangi and Church disagreed with the Service.  The partnerships in both cases were pro 
rata partnerships, in which each investor’s interest was proportional to the capital contributed.  Because taxpayers’ 
contributions were reflected fully in their partnership capital accounts, the courts found no gift on formation had oc-
curred.  Additionally, in  Strangi, the Tax Court emphasized no gift had occurred because the decedent did not give 
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up control over the assets, since his interest in the FLP exceeded 99%.
65
  Both Strangi and Church have just been 
upheld in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the taxpayer on the issue of gift on formation.
66
    
 
 The most critical element in rebutting the IRS’ gift on formation argument against a FLP is ensuring that 
the taxpayer’s contributions to the partnership are reflected in the dollar amount of his capital account.  This was not 
the case in Shepard,
67
 where the taxpayer contributed all of the assets, but received only 50% of the value of the ent-
ity.  The taxpayer’s sons received the other 50%, although they had made no contributions.  Here the Tax Court held 
the taxpayer’s transfer represented indirect gifts to his sons.  In contrast, in Jones,68the court found no gift had oc-
curred on formation of the FLP because ―all of the contributions of property were properly reflected in the capital 
accounts of decedent and the value of the other partners’ interests was not enhanced by the contributions of dece-
dent.‖69 
 
The following section examines the Service’s use of Sec. 2036 in arguing that the full FMV of assets trans-
ferred to a FLP should be included in a decedent’s estate and not the lesser value derived after application of valua-
tion discounts.  The IRS has enjoyed some success in employing this ―retained interest‖ argument against FLPs.  In 
particular, taxpayers should be aware that the Fifth Circuit has remanded Strangi back to the Tax Court for consider-
ation of the Sec. 2036 issue.
70
 
 
Section 2036 
 
Sec. 2036(a) ―pulls back‖ previously transferred property into the estate if the decedent retained possession, 
enjoyment, or income from the property, or where the decedent retained the ability to designate persons having pos-
session or enjoyment rights.  Bona fide sales of property do not fall under Sec. 2036.  For example, assume a parent 
gives legal title to her personal residence to a child, but continues to live in the residence as before, without paying 
rent.   Since the parent continues to enjoy the property, the FMV of the house (including any appreciation accrued 
from the transfer the parent’s death) is included in the estate under Sec. 2036.   
 
Retention of stock voting rights is considered a right of enjoyment under Sec. 2036.
71
  If the taxpayer trans-
fers stock in a small corporation to the FLP, the taxpayer should be prepared to reduce his right to vote (directly or 
indirectly under Sec. 318) to less than 20% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock.
72
 Alternative-
ly, the taxpayer should consider transferring nonvoting stock to the FLP, if possible.   
 
 The Service has enjoyed no small measure of success in applying Sec. 2036 to FLP situations, causing as-
sets purportedly transferred to a FLP during the taxpayer’s lifetime (and thus thought removed from estate taxes) to 
be pulled back into the estate.  The reason for the Service’s success is simply the taxpayer’s blatant disregard for the 
existence of the FLP.  For example, in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner,
73
 the taxpayer transferred legal title to 
substantially all of his property, including his personal residence, to the FLP.
74
  Afterwards, he continued to live in 
the residence without paying rent.
75
  The decedent also commingled partnership and personal funds--depositing 
partnership income into a personal account and using the FLP’s checking account to pay personal expenses.76  The 
Tax Court sided with the Service and applied Sec. 2036.
77
 
 
Similarly, in Dorothy Schauerhamer,
78
 taxpayer’s transfers of property to three FLPs were included in her 
estate when the Tax Court found the decedent had managed the assets and income exactly as she had before the 
transfer.  As in Reichardt, the taxpayer had deposited income from the FLPs into her personal checking account, 
where it was commingled with income from other sources,
79
and from which she paid both personal and partnership 
expenses.
80
 
 
 In Strangi, the Service raised the Sec. 2036 issue in a proposed amendment to its original filing with the 
Tax Court, arguing Sec. 2036 should apply because the taxpayer, acting together with other shareholders of the cor-
porate general managing partner, could cause the FLP to make distributions.  Even the majority opinion tacitly 
agreed with this, noting the actual control exercised by the taxpayer ―suggests the possibility of including the prop-
erty transferred to the partnership in decedent’s estate under section 2036.‖81  Judge Parr’s dissenting opinion in 
Strangi provides examples:  the FLP paid for Strangi’s nurse’s medical expenses, distributed funds to the estate to 
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pay estate and inheritance taxes, distributed proceeds to Strangi’s children, divided its Merrill Lynch account into 
four separate accounts for the children, extended lines of credit to the limited partners and advanced funds to the es-
tate to post bonds with the IRS.
82
  ―It is clear,‖ the judge noted, that ―contrary to the written partnership agreement, 
decedent and his successor in interest to his partnership interest (decedent’s estate) had the ability to withdraw funds 
at will.‖83 
 
 The Tax Court did not rule on the Sec. 2036 issue in Strangi, deciding that the Service had not raised the is-
sue in a timely fashion.
84
  However, the Fifth Circuit has just remanded Strangi back to the Tax Court for considera-
tion of this issue.
85
  This is a significant development in the case.  If the Tax Court finds that Sec. 2036 applies, as 
may be expected given the majority’s acknowledgement of such a possibility, the assets thought previously trans-
ferred to the FLP will be swept back into the estate and the $3.3 million valuation discount would disappear. 
 
 The sweep of Sec. 2036 may spell future disaster for other FLPs, even those that have successfully chal-
lenged the IRS in court.   For example, in Knight, the taxpayer and children continued to use a substantial portion of 
the partnership assets (two houses and a ranch) before and after formation of the FLP.
86
  The children lived in the 
houses, but did not pay rent to the partnership.  Likewise, the taxpayer continued to operate the ranch as before, pay-
ing no rent to the FLP until after the Tax Court petition was filed.
87
  Since the taxpayer in Knight was not deceased, 
Sec. 2036 was not an issue.  If the IRS is able to revisit the Knight situation after the taxpayer’s death, Sec. 2036 
should prove the weapon of choice. 
 
Valuation Discounts  
 
 The application of valuation discounts to FLP limited partnership interests reflects the lack of economic 
control the limited partner has over the FLP’s assets.  For example, while a limited partner owns a pro rata amount 
of the FLP’s net assets, he cannot compel distribution of those assets, due to restrictions inherent in the limited part-
nership format.  To reflect this lack of economic control, valuation discounts establish the value of the limited part-
nership interest as less than the FMV of the pro rata share of assets for transfer tax purposes.  Valuation  
discounts may be claimed to reflect the following restrictions on a limited partnership interest: 
 
 The interest is a minority interest 
 The partner cannot easily withdraw from the FLP 
 The partner cannot easily transfer his interest 
 The partner has no voting rights 
 The interest lacks marketability  
 The limited partner cannot compel income distributions 
 
The IRS’ quarrel with valuation discounts is that they reduce the amount subject to transfer taxes.  In Field 
Service Advice 200049003, the Service first counsels agents to attack the substance of the FLP.  Obviously, if there 
is no FLP, there is no valuation discount.  Failing this, the Service recommends arguing that no discount is needed 
and advances two hypothetical arguments: (1) if a  FLP holds passive assets, it is analogous to a trust, where no dis-
count is applied on contribution of assets
88
 or (2) if a FLP holds liquid assets, it is unlikely the transferor would 
agree to sell such an interest at a discounted value.
89
 
 
However, in advising its agents, the Service has conceded that valuation discounts may be necessary.  In 
FSA 200049003, the Service equated FLPs holding readily marketable assets to publicly traded closed-end mutual 
funds, and noted the latter trade ―at a discount from net asset value of 4% to 12%…to reflect the disadvantages of a 
minority interest.‖90  Further, because FLP interests, unlike mutual funds, are not readily marketable, the Service 
admitted ―it may be necessary to concede an additional discount for lack of marketability.‖91  FSA 200143004 also 
agrees that discounts may be necessary for minority interests
92
 and lack of marketability.
93
   
 
In court, once the decision has been made to respect the FLP, the valuation discounts follow.  The final 
amount of the discounts is generally a trade-off between the two sides’ respective expert witnesses.  Thus, in Stran-
gi, the taxpayer’s expert advanced a 33% effective discount;94 the government’s, 31%.95  The court used 31%.96  In 
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Church, the taxpayer’s discount was 42%;97 the government’s, zero;98 the court used 42%.99  In Knight, the final dis-
count was 24%
100
 versus the taxpayer’s original 44%.101  Taxpayers forming FLPs must recognize that valuation 
discounts calculated by their expert appraiser will be countered by those determined by the government’s expert and 
plan accordingly.  
 
Valuation discounts exist as a source of controversy for taxpayers and the IRS because of the onerous bur-
den of the transfer taxes.  What happens if the transfer tax system is changed?  The next section examines recent 
proposals in Congress to eliminate one of the taxes—the estate tax and discusses the impact of this upon FLPs. 
 
Current Developments – Eliminating The Estate Tax 
 
In April 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a measure that would have eliminated the estate 
tax by repealing the sunset provision contained in the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
(EGTRRA). PL 107-16).
102
 Although the bill failed to pass the Senate,
103
 the issue enjoyed heavy support and may 
be raised again in the next fiscal year. 
 
What EGTRRA did in 2001 was slowly drop the transfer tax until 2010, when the rates abruptly plunge to 
zero.  Then, in 2011, the bill restores the tax to its original rate of 55%.  Chart 1 below shows the rate reductions es-
tablished by EGTRRA.   Chart 2 shows the Gift Tax Rate Schedule for years 2002-2011. 
 
 
Chart 1: Transfer Tax Rates and Unified Credit Amounts 
 
Estate and Gift Tax Rates and Unified Credit Exemption Amount 
Calendar Year Estate and GST Tax Deathtime 
Transfer Exemption 
Highest Estate and Gift Tax Rates 
2002 $1,000,000 50% 
2003 $1,000,000 49% 
2004 $1,500,000 48% 
2005 $1,500,000 47% 
2006 $2,000,000 45% 
2007 $2,000,000 45% 
2008 $2,000,000 45% 
2009 $3,500,000 45% 
2010 N/A      0% Estate Taxes 
35% Gift Taxes 
2011 $   675,000 55% 
  
EGTRRA only repeals the estate tax; not the gift tax.  It retains the yearly $11,000 gift tax exclusion. 
EGTRRA also limits the step-up in basis for assets passing through the estate, beginning in 2010.  A decedent’s es-
tate would be permitted to increase the basis of assets transferred by up to a total of $1.3 million.  The basis of prop-
erty transferred to a surviving spouse could be increased by an additional $3 million, for a total of $4.3 million. 
 
Impact of Possible Estate Tax Repeal on FLPs 
 
If the estate tax is repealed, IRS attacks on transfers of FLP limited partnership interests occurring at death 
would seem to cease.  If there is no tax, there is no need for valuation discounts.  The beneficiaries would essentially 
take a carryover basis for the limited partnership interest transferred, adjusted for the limited step-up of $1.3 million 
mentioned earlier.  Ending the estate tax also ends any need for Sec. 2036.  Since this section has been a successful 
tool for the Service’s attacks on FLPs, this may be a welcome relief.   
 
Since the gift tax remains in existence under EGTRRA and the 2002 repeal efforts, FLP transfers during 
the taxpayer’s lifetime, such as those in Knight,104 Church105 and Shepard,106 would still be subject to IRS attack for 
using valuation discounts to reduce exposure to the gift tax.  Obviously, one strategy would be to wait until death to 
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transfer the assets to the FLP, since there would be no transfer tax at this time.  Failing that, the taxpayer must be 
prepared to continue the battle with the IRS. 
 
 
Chart 2:  Gift Tax Rate Schedule 2002-2011 
 
 
 
Source:  Congressional Research Service, July 25, 2001 
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Tax Planning:  Responding to the IRS’ Challenges 
 
The Business Purpose/Economic Substance Challenge 
 
The courts have diminished the emphasis placed on this argument by the IRS when it comes to FLPs.  In 
general, if a FLP is validly formed under applicable state law, the courts will respect it.  Taxpayers should be aware 
that the courts, in diminishing the business purpose/economic substance test, have now advanced to prominence a 
―willing buyer/willing seller‖ standard which asks whether the hypothetical willing buyer would respect the FLP as 
an entity and adjust the purchase price to reflect the legal restrictions imposed upon a limited partnership interest. 
 
 The wise taxpayer will likewise respect the legal form of the FLP to strengthen defenses against IRS at-
tacks.  In particular, the taxpayer cannot behave as if the FLP did not exist and hope the courts will agree.  At a min-
imum, the following steps should be adhered to: 
 
 All appropriate actions must be followed to create and recognize the FLP under state law.  Legal title to 
contributed assets must be transferred to the FLP.  Appropriate business licenses and permits must be ob-
tained in the FLP’s name.  When drafting the partnership agreement, care should be taken to ensure that 
any restrictions on liquidation of the FLP are not more restrictive than applicable state law, to avoid the 
IRS’ application of Sec. 2704. 
 
 The FLP must keep separate business records, have a business checking account and prepare annual reports 
to partners.  Partnership meetings should be held and the minutes recorded.  Federal and state partnership 
income tax returns must be filed. 
 
 Partners must deal at an arm’s-length basis with the FLP.  Partners should not commingle personal and 
business funds.  If a partner uses a FLP asset, rent equal to an objective FMV should be paid by the partner 
to the FLP.  Taxpayers must recognize that by contributing personal-use assets to a FLP and continuing ei-
ther to exercise control over the assets or to enjoy the assets’ use, they invite attack under Sec. 2036 in es-
tate tax situations. 
 
 Assets must be carefully appraised and documented by an independent appraiser to substantiate valuation 
discount percentages. 
 
 Gift tax returns must be filed to reflect all assets gifted to children in order to establish the capital balances 
required to substantiate income distributions in FLPs where partnership capital is a significant factor. 
  
IRS Challenges Under Sec. 2703 and Sec. 2704 
 
Section 2703:  Not a Threat to the Taxpayer 
 
Sections 2703 and 2704 require that restrictions on property be ignored when determining FMV for transfer 
tax purposes.  Sec. 2703 applies to sales and use restrictions on the property and Sec. 2704 to liquidation restrictions. 
 
The Service has attempted to apply Sec. 2703 in FLP situations by arguing that the FLP itself is a restric-
tion on a limited partner’s ability to sell or use the partnership property.  The courts in Strangi107 and Church108 have 
not agreed with this approach.  As with the business purpose test, the judiciary has shown itself unwilling to ignore 
validly formed FLPs.  Sec. 2703 does not seem to pose a problem for FLPs at this point. 
 
Section 2704:  Consider Adding a Non-Family Member as Partner 
 
Taxpayers should be slightly more concerned with the Service’s application of Sec. 2704.  When a FLP 
partnership agreement is drafted, it should not contain restrictions on liquidation of a partnership interest that are 
more restrictive than applicable state law.  In Kerr,
109
 the leading case on this issue, the Fifth Circuit has recently 
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upheld the Tax Court in its finding that liquidation restrictions in a FLP formed under Texas law did not violate Sec. 
2704.  The cases of Knight
110
 and Estate of Jones
111
 also successfully relied on Kerr in Tax Court. 
 
Since the Circuit Court’s decision in Kerr rested on the court’s determination that Sec. 2704(b)’s general 
rule applied to liquidation restrictions removable only by family members, cautious taxpayers may wish to follow 
Kerr and transfer a nominal interest in the FLP to a non-family member, such as a college.  The addition of a non-
family member as a limited partner blocks Sec. 2704(b), since family members no longer hold 100% of the partner-
ship interests and thus will not able to remove liquidation restrictions at will.  This was the strategy that upheld Kerr 
in the Fifth Circuit, where the court ruled Sec. 2704(b) did not apply because the FLP consisted of only family 
members.  
 
The Gift on Formation Challenge 
 
 The IRS’ gift on formation argument, which provides that transferring property for less than its FMV re-
sults in a gift and negates any valuation discounts, has had some success in court, most notably in Shepard
112
 and 
Kincaid.
113
  However, this challenge can be rebutted by the taxpayer transferring property to a FLP by adhering to 
the fact situations represented in the cases of Strangi
114
, Church
115
 and Jones.
116
  The key is to ensure that the con-
tributing partner’s transfers of property are reflected in full in her partnership capital account.  Any transfers of li-
mited partnership interests to other family members must occur after (emphasis added) the initial transfer of proper-
ty and crediting to the capital account, to avoid the unfortunate result in Shepard.
117
 
 
The Sec. 2036 Challenge 
 
Sec. 2036 has proven to be one of the Service’s most successful challenges to FLPs affected by estate tax-
es.  By using Sec. 2036 to pull back property into the estate where the decedent retained incidents of ownership or 
enjoyment or the ability to assign these rights to others, the IRS in effect voids any valuation discounts on the prop-
erty. 
 
The Service’s success in employing Sec. 2036 is due simply to taxpayer carelessness and disregard for the 
FLP as a legal entity.  Taxpayers in Strangi,
118
 Reichardt,
119
 and Schauerhamer
120
 continued to control and use FLP 
assets as they had before the FLP’s formation.  They used FLP funds to pay personal expenses, commingled busi-
ness and personal monies and lived in FLP-owned residences without paying rent. 
 
The recent Fifth Circuit’s decision to remand Strangi back to the Tax Court for consideration of the Sec. 
2036 issue will probably result in assets being pulled back into the estate and valuation discounts being lost.  Again, 
this result could easily have been avoided had the taxpayer taken steps to respect the existence of the FLP and dealt 
with the FLP in an arm’s length manner for all transactions. 
 
The Valuation Discounts Challenge 
 
 The courts have not quarreled with the concept of valuation discounts for FLPs.  If they recognize the exis-
tence of the FLP, the courts permit the discount.  However, the courts have shown themselves as willing to accept 
the discount calculations of the IRS’ experts as they have those of the taxpayer’s experts.  There is no guarantee that 
the taxpayer’s full amount of discount will stand in court.  This is not due to any prejudice by the courts against the 
taxpayer; on the contrary, the Tax Court (and increasingly, the Fifth Circuit), have so far upheld the FLP against IRS 
challenges.  Rather, the final determination of the discount, if decided in court, will often be a compromise between 
numbers put forth by the two sides’ respective expert appraisers. 
 
 Because of this negotiated aspect of the valuation discounts, the taxpayer will not generally be able to en-
sure that his discounts will stand in full and should be prepared to accept a changed discount percentage.  The tax-
payer may be able to minimize the damage by hiring a qualified independent appraiser with significant successful 
court experience in this area. 
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Conclusions 
 
Family limited partnerships remain a strong and effective mechanism for transferring family wealth from 
one generation to another.  These entities have proven themselves capable of withstanding IRS audit and court chal-
lenges seeking to disregard a FLP’s legal existence.  The courts have also upheld the use of valuation discounts ap-
plied by taxpayers to reduce gift and estate taxes.  
 
In particular, courts have held that a validly formed FLP with liquation provisions paralleling those of ap-
plicable state law will withstand Service challenges under the following arguments:  economic substance/business 
purpose, Section 2703 and Section 2704.  Countering the IRS’ gift on formation argument requires only that the tax-
payer’s initial transfers to the FLP be reflected in full in his capital account.  Avoiding the Service’s Section 2036 
challenge necessitates that the taxpayer respect the legal form of the FLP and deal with the entity in an arm’s-length 
manner in all transactions.  By exercising care in forming and operating the FLP, taxpayers and their advisers can 
safeguard the transfer of family assets and minimize the tax cost of such transfers. 
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